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OPENING THE DOORS TO WOMEN?  AN EXAMINATION OF 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ASYLUM AND REFUGEE LAW 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, immigration law has undergone an expansion of the 
grounds for granting asylum and withholding deportation.  In particular, in 
regard to human rights violations inflicted on women, courts have recognized 
new categories of “social groups,” one of the grounds on which asylum may be 
granted or deportation withheld.  The consequence of these decisions has been 
that more women may be granted refugee status in the United States.  Yet, 
while positive steps have been taken in the area of asylum law in regard to 
women’s human rights, courts still are evolving—and must continue to 
evolve—in their understanding of women’s human rights issues and the need 
to grant persecuted women asylum. 
One issue that has received much attention of late is the possibility that a 
woman may establish “social group” status based on a likelihood of being 
forced to undergo female genital mutilation (FGM).  That is, women who have 
a well-founded fear of being forced to undergo FGM upon return to their 
country of origin are now recognized as belonging to a particular social group 
and can thus be granted refugee status.1  FGM, also known as female 
circumcision, is, at this point, a relatively well-known reproductive health issue 
confronting many women, particularly in African countries.2  FGM is a broad 
 
 1. See In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (1996).  Female genital mutilation has 
three main forms, which have been classified by the Department of State.  Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 
F.3d 634, 638 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing OFFICE OF THE SENIOR COORDINATOR FOR INT’L 
WOMEN’S ISSUES, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PREVALENCE OF THE PRACTICE OF FEMALE GENITAL 
MUTILATION (FGM); LAWS PROHIBITING FGM AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT; 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO BEST WORK TO ELIMINATE FGM 5 (2001) (June 27, 2001), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/9424.pdf).  Type I, commonly referred 
to as a “clitoridectomy,” involves the removal of the clitoral hood, and may involve removal of 
the clitoris.  Id.  Type II, “excision,” involves removing the clitoris and either part or all of the 
labia minora.  Id.  Type III, “infibulation,” entails removing all or part of the external genitalia 
(clitoris, labia minora, and labia majora), and stitching the vaginal opening shut.  Id.  A small 
opening is left through which urine and menstrual blood can flow.  Id. 
 2. Adrien Katherine Wing & Tyler Murray Smith, The New African Union and Women’s 
Rights, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 43 (2003). 
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term for different types of “surgeries”3 involving removal of smaller or larger 
parts of the woman’s genitalia for the purpose of punishment for engaging in 
premarital sex, as a tribal custom, to kill sexual urges, or to ensure virginity at 
time of marriage.4  The surgeries usually are performed with unsanitary and 
non-medical instruments, and the rate of infection is high, often exposing the 
girl or woman to “serious, potentially life-threatening complications” such as 
“bleeding, infection, urine retention, stress, shock, psychological trauma, and 
damages to the urethra and anus.”5 
The inclusion of FGM victims as a relatively new social group category 
represents a greater awareness of the brutality of the practice of FGM, and, 
moreover, could portend greater openness to expanding the social group 
category to include a wider range of women in particularly terrible situations.  
Thus, other human rights violations commonly perpetrated on women in a 
certain area of the world could potentially be addressed under the same line of 
reasoning to expand asylum prospects.  For example, in Africa, “[c]ustomary 
and religious perceptions of women as marital property . . . [mean that] 
domestic abuse at the will of the male [is tolerated].”6  Therefore, perhaps 
African women whose partners abuse them could assert they are part of a 
particular “social group.”  Similarly, the low status of women in that region 
means that they have little bargaining power to demand that their partners use 
protection during sex.7 African women are therefore much more at risk for 
contracting AIDS and other diseases than their male counterparts.8  The 
awareness of FGM can and has sparked greater awareness of other women’s 
human rights violations, particularly those occurring within the same region of 
the globe.  It also has helped women exploit the social group category to a 
greater degree.  Still, the social group designation is only a “second-best 
solution” to what would be much more advantageous to women’s human 
rights: including persecution based on gender as an independent basis for 
asylum. 
The FGM decisions also have raised new questions in asylum and refugee 
law, such as whether to grant derivative asylum to parents and other relatives 
 
 3. The term “surgery” to describe the procedure is probably a misnomer, since the 
procedure is not performed out of medical necessity. 
 4. See id. 
 5. In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 361.  For more on the devastating effects of 
female genital mutilation, see Wing & Smith, supra note 2. 
 6. Wing & Smith, supra note 2, at 42. 
 7. Id. at 45. 
 8. See id. at 45–46.  Approximately 55% of African people living with AIDS are women.  
Id. at 45.  Moreover, women with AIDS often die within six months of diagnosis, because of the 
stigmatization of the disease and a resultant lack of medical care.  Id.  The authors observe that 
women who have undergone FGM are at an even higher risk of HIV infection, due to micro-
lesions that often occur during intercourse, allowing the virus to enter the body easily.  Id. 
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whose loved ones are likely to undergo FGM.  It also is unclear what the limits 
to expansion of the term “social group” will be, as the federal circuits have 
adopted different criteria for determining what constitutes a social group.9  
Most germane to this Comment is the issue of which groups of affected women 
afflicted by what sorts of women’s human rights violations will be protected 
under this category. 
Using FGM as a valuable and noteworthy starting point, this Comment 
will demonstrate that, although immigration law in relation to endangered 
groups of women has expanded significantly, some areas of the current law 
still fail to adequately protect the human rights of women refugees and asylum-
seekers, for various reasons.  Centrally, it will argue that the law should cover 
these groups of excluded women.  To this end, Section II of this Comment 
discusses the legal framework that governs asylum law in the United States.  It 
is within this framework that advocates for extending asylum to victims of 
human rights violations must currently operate.  Section III offers some 
foundational feminist legal theory for the purpose of arguing that it is 
important to recognize women’s human rights claims as valid, and therefore 
deserving of asylum protection.  Section IV deals first with recent FGM 
decisions and the broadening of the definition of “social group” in immigration 
law.  In this section, claims by victims of private-party abuse and rape also are 
addressed.  Section V of the Comment analyzes treatment of derivative asylum 
claims among several of the circuits, and recommends a flexible approach to 
this determination.  Finally, the Conclusion makes suggestions as to how 
women’s rights can be better protected through a further expanded and more 
clear-cut set of asylum and withholding of deportation standards. 
II.  FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND ASYLUM CLAIMS 
This Comment takes as a basic premise that violence and persecution 
perpetrated on women is wrong and that these actions constitute violations of 
human rights.  The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women defines violence against women as “any act of gender-based 
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or 
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, 
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in 
private life.”10  Violence against women is a worldwide phenomenon.  The 
violence takes on diverse forms, however, depending on the various cultural 
assumptions and traditions of a region or country.  Severe restrictions on 
 
 9. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the circuits’ differing views on what constitutes a 
social group. 
 10. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, art. 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (Dec. 20, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/ 
a48r104.htm. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
664 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:661 
reproductive rights, another form of persecution, frequently are experienced by 
women in China, as the cases discussed below demonstrate.11  Marital rape and 
domestic abuse appear to be experienced by women worldwide.12  In fact, “the 
World Health Organization has reported that up to 70 per cent of female 
murder victims are killed by their male partners.”13  In large part, the reason 
behind the widespread violence against women is society’s failure to recognize 
these abuses as wrong; rather, they often are viewed as an acceptable part of 
society.14 
Thus, some feminist scholars have stated that a central focus of the 
women’s human rights movement should be first to legitimize women’s 
claims, the end goal being to transform society as a whole so that violence 
against women is no longer deemed acceptable.15  One of the reasons proffered 
for why women’s human rights are not recognized to the same degree as other 
“generic” human rights is that the field of human rights historically has been 
dominated by men, who bring typical male viewpoints to their study and 
promulgation of human rights.16  Rights such as a right to be free from 
domestic violence have been seen as falling into a “private” sphere of 
unregulated conduct—where most women find themselves.17  These rights are 
deemed inferior to rights that operate in the “public” sphere, such as legal and 
political rights (the arena in which men are far more active).18  Having a place 
where one may act to a large extent unregulated by the government is not in 
itself a harmful ideal, but problems occur when certain persons are subjected to 
abuse in that private forum and find themselves without recourse.  Half of the 
world’s citizens are thereby potentially denied the freedom that the “private 
sphere” de-regulation was meant to effect.  The end result is that women’s 
concerns have not been visible to the world.19 
 
 11. See infra Part IV.C. 
 12. The Human Rights Watch’s Web site comments that “[c]ountries as diverse as Uganda, 
Nepal, Pakistan, South Africa, Jordan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Peru have one thing in common: 
horrendous records on addressing domestic violence.”  Human Rights Watch, Domestic Violence, 
http://www.hrw.org/women/domesticviolence.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2005). 
 13. See Amnesty International, Worldwide Scandal, http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ 
web.nsf/print/scandal-index-eng (last visited Jan. 30, 2005). 
 14. This is especially true in FGM cases and “honor killing” cases.  See id. 
 15. See Hilary Charlesworth, What are “Women’s International Human Rights”?, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 58, 67 (Rebecca J. 
Cook ed., 1994) (citing CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE 
AND LAW 104 (1987)). 
 16. Id. at 68–71. 
 17. See id. at 69. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. at 63.  Charlesworth states that “[o]nly recently have non-governmental 
organizations in the human rights area begun to acknowledge the particular disadvantages faced 
by women.”  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] OPENING THE DOORS TO WOMEN? 665 
Authors also have lamented that one of the most difficult obstacles to 
overcome in promoting women’s rights is the misconception that 
discrimination based on race is a much more serious and devastating problem 
than discrimination or abuse based on sex.20  This idea is mirrored in the 
United States’ immigration law, which identifies race as a basis upon which 
one can establish persecution, but does not grant the same protection to those 
who are persecuted on account of sex.  Instead, those who are persecuted 
because they are women generally have to show some further “social group 
classification.”21  Similarly, as discussed below, the United States requires 
aliens to show some government involvement in their persecutions.  This 
requirement reinforces the idea that refugees only should be protected if they 
are abused in the “public sphere.”  On the other hand, those who find 
themselves in danger in private situations are left without a foundation upon 
which to base their asylum claims. 
Many of the asylum claims that women bring involve egregious violations 
of human rights.  If the same acts—rape, physical abuse, etc.—were 
undertaken because of one’s political beliefs or race, these persons could be 
granted asylum.  However, since the violence is inflicted on women “only” 
because of their sex and subsequent position in society, the same women are 
left defenseless.  If women’s human rights concerns are to be properly 
addressed, the distinction between public and private spheres, with abuses 
being tolerated in the private sphere, must be erased.  The grounds upon which 
asylum or withholding of deportation and humanitarian asylum are based 
therefore should broaden to include the real problems that endanger women.   
One striking illustration of the public/private dichotomy, discussed briefly 
above, involves women who are at risk for rape by their family members or 
other “private” actors.  In certain regions, particularly in Africa, these partners 
often are infected with AIDS.22  In this case, the harm that many socio-
economically disadvantaged African women face is infection and, ultimately, 
death.23  Women in such a situation should not be denied asylum based on lack 
of official government action in their persecution.  Yet courts often are 
unwilling to allow asylum based on the public/private dichotomy, and they 
show an unwillingness to grant asylum on the basis of abuses that occur with 
frequency in the United States, as well (such as marital rape and abuse).24  The 
 
 20. Charlesworth, supra note 15, at 65. 
 21. For a more detailed discussion of the added requirements for women to establish a 
“social group,” see infra Part III. 
 22. See Wing & Smith, supra note 2, at 45–46. 
 23. Id. at 45. 
 24. Some authors have noted that international law and Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) guidelines officially have recognized domestic violence as a legitimate basis for 
asylum.  E.g., Deborah Anker et al., Women Whose Governments Are Unable or Unwilling to 
Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic Violence May Qualify as Refugees Under United 
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result is far from logical.  It is important for the advancement of all human 
rights to recognize that oft-overlooked violations of women’s rights deserve to 
be a basis for asylum in the United States.  Though advances have been made, 
courts must increase their understanding and recognition of women’s human 
rights issues, and the legislature must continue to act to expand protection 
granted to women in the form of asylum. 
III.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Refugee law in the United States is largely based on the United Nations 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol to that 
Convention.25  Under United States law, a person who qualifies as a refugee 
may obtain asylum in the United States and avoid being deported to his or her 
country of origin if he or she fulfills certain requirements.26  To an alien 
present in the United States, various options are available to avoid being 
deported to one’s home country.  By federal statute, an alien may seek either a 
grant of asylum or a withholding of deportation.27  A withholding of 
deportation can be effected either by section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (INA)28 or under the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the 
Convention), as that treaty is codified in federal statute.29 
 
States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709, 713 (1997).  However, as discussed below, courts 
continue to use the public–private distinction to deny many asylum claims based on domestic 
violence.  Similarly, in 1994, one author noted that “it remains an open question whether 
privately inflicted gender violence will be treated unequivocally as a human rights violation.”  
Rhonda Copeland, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 294 (1994). 
 25. Anker et al., supra note 24, at 711 (citing United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugess, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (Apr. 22, 1954), and the Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugess, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (Jan. 21, 1967)).  “If one thing is clear from the legislative history 
of . . . the entire 1980 [Refugee] Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring 
United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol [R]elating to 
the Status of Refugees.”  Id. at 712 n.7 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 
(1987)). 
 26. See Anker et al., supra note 24, at 712.  A refugee is defined as: 
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a 
person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually 
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group or political opinion. 
Id. (quoting the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(2000)). 
 27. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a) (2004). 
 28. 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a). 
 29. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984), available at 
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A. Withholding of Deportation Under the U.S. Interpretation of the 
Convention 
Under the Convention as enacted by the United States, an applicant for 
withholding of deportation is required to prove that it is “more likely than not” 
that he or she would be tortured if removed.30  That is, as a party to the 
Convention, the United States is obligated to ensure that aliens are not returned 
to countries where they are likely to be tortured.31  To fulfill its treaty 
obligations, the United States has enacted statutes and regulations that prohibit 
refoulement, or the return of the alien to a dangerous country.32  Under the 
Convention’s definition of torture, however, the persecution must be 
committed by state actors, or at the very least, with the “acquiescence” of state 
or governmental officials.33 
The meanings of the Convention terms as embodied in U.S. law are subject 
to the “reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in 
the United States Senate resolution of ratification of the Convention.”34  The 
United States’ definition of torture therefore governs all decisions made in 
conjunction with the Convention.  Thus, it is erroneous to say that the 
Convention itself governs the circumstances under which withholding of 
deportation can be effected.  It is important to distinguish between the 
Convention as drafted by the United Nations and the Convention as adopted by 
the United States.  In almost all cases, the United States’ formulation of the 
Convention is more restrictive than the Convention’s original or “non-
interpreted” provisions, making it more difficult to invoke the “interpreted” 
Convention as grounds for asylum.35 
 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].  
For a list of U.S. understandings and reservations to the Convention Against Torture, see 136 
CONG. REC. 26, 36192–93 (1990). 
 30. 8 C.F.R. § 208(16)(c)(2). 
 31. Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, at art. 3(1).  This is called the principle of 
non-refoulement.  See id. 
 32. The United States has implemented its Convention Against Torture obligations by 
enacting legislation such as the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-761. 
 33. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, at art. 1.  The Ninth Circuit has held that 
the key to torture is acquiescence by state actors, not being held in custody by officials while 
torture was performed.  Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2004).  However, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals has taken the position that, in order to demonstrate 
acquiescence, the alien must do more than show that the government official was aware of the 
torture but unable to stop it.  Rather, he or she must show that government officials are “willfully 
accepting” the torture.  In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312 (2000). 
 34. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 § 2242(f)(2). 
 35. For example, the United States has, until recently, defined torture in an extremely narrow 
manner.  See Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: 
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One obvious example of the difference between the Convention as drafted 
and the Convention as implemented by the United States is that the Convention 
states that an alien shall not be deported to his or her home country if 
substantial grounds exist for believing he or she will be tortured.36  On the 
other hand, the Convention as implemented in United States immigration 
legislation states that refoulement is prohibited when it is “more likely than 
not” that the alien will be tortured upon his or her return.37  This interpretation 
clearly places a heavier burden of proof on the alien to show likelihood of 
being tortured.  She must prove that country or regional circumstances indicate 
it is more likely than not that she will be tortured in her home country.  In 
effect, the interpretation ups the “probability” by which each alien must show 
evidence of torture to fifty-one percent or more. 
Moreover, the Convention defines torture as “any act by which severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person . . . .”38  The United States’ official implementation policy of the 
Convention defines torture as “an extreme form of cruel and unusual 
punishment committed under the color of law.”39  The State Department has 
emphasized that this definition is to be interpreted in a limited fashion, and has 
stated that “rough treatment, such as police brutality, ‘while deplorable, does 
not amount to “torture” for purposes of the Convention.’”40 
 
Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations 4–5 (Mar. 6, 2003), 
http://www.cdi.org/news/lw/pentagon-torture-memo.pdf. 
 36. Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, at art. 3(1). 
 37. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208(16)(c)(2) (2004) 
(emphasis added); see also Azanor, 364 F.3d at 1020. 
 38. Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, at art. 1(1).  The article reads: 
[Torture is] any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain and 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.  It does not include pain or 
suffering arising from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
Id. 
 39. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, THE U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF 
U.S. IMPLEMENTATION POLICY CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS (Mar. 11, 2004) (introductory summary), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ 
awcgate/crs/rl32276.pdf. 
 40. Id. at 2 (citing President’s Message to Congress Transmitting the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Summary and 
Analysis of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, May 23, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, reprinted in 13857 U.S. Cong. Serial 
Set, at 3 (1990)). 
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Torture also must be engaged in with a specific intent on the part of the 
torturer.  If the harm caused is unintentional or unanticipated, then the acts are 
not considered torture.41  Additionally, because of the way the United States 
has implemented the Convention—and the way the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) has interpreted that implementation—an alien must show a 
specific intent on the part of the torturer to engage in torturing the victim, 
which could be quite difficult to prove.42  This interpretation of the treaty 
language may well be in contravention of the intent of the treaty drafters, who 
most likely added the word “intentional” in order to exclude negligent or 
accidental pain from the definition of torture.43  Again, the burden placed on 
the alien to show evidence that he or she will be tortured is heavier under 
United States law than it is under the Convention as drafted; in the United 
States, applicants essentially must prove the perpetrator’s “specific intent to 
torture” at the time the torture took place. 
B. Withholding of Deportation 
Withholding of deportation is the second means by which an alien may 
remain in the United States.  The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
requires an applicant to prove that his or her life or freedom would be 
threatened (i.e., that he or she would be persecuted) by being returned to the 
home country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.44  If an applicant meets his or her 
burden of proof on this issue of persecution, there is no discretion on the part 
of the Attorney General; he or she must withhold the alien’s deportation.45  To 
have deportation withheld, the alien must establish by a “clear probability” that 
his or her life or freedom would be at risk if deported.46  That is, the alien must 
show it is more likely than not that he or she would be subject to persecution.47  
Unlike under the Convention, he or she does not have to prove that life or 
freedom would be endangered by a government official or with the 
 
 41. See GARCIA, supra note 40. 
 42. One of the Senate’s understandings taken at the time of the ratification of the Convention 
Against Torture requires that “in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended 
to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering . . . .”  136 CONG. REC. 25, 36193 (1990). 
 43. See Lori A. Nessel, “Willful Blindness” to Gender-Based Violence Abroad: United 
States’ Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 71, 126 (2004), for an argument that the United States’ interpretation of the 
definition of torture is contrary to the drafters’ intent. 
 44. Procedures for Asylum and Witholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(a), (b)(1) (2004). 
 45. Id. § 208.16(d)(1). 
 46. Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 
46, 47 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 47. Id. at 469 (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984)). 
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acquiescence of the government, however.48  The alien may meet his or her 
burden of proof by his or her own testimony.49  If “credible,” no corroboration 
of the alien’s testimony is needed; rather, the testimony alone can suffice to 
show that he or she is at risk.50 
C. Asylum 
The third option available to an alien seeking refuge is to obtain a grant of 
asylum.  The standard of proof for a grant of asylum is less stringent than 
needed to withhold deportation—it requires only a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted on return to one’s home country, as opposed to a “clear 
probability . . . [of] persecution” required under Zubeda.51  The Supreme Court 
has explicitly held that the two standards are not the same, and that grant of 
asylum is to be decided on the “well-founded fear” standard, which practically 
translates to a lower requirement for documentation or other “hard” evidence 
of persecution or abuses.52  The Court has stated that a well-founded fear of 
persecution could be established if 
[we] presume that it is known that in the applicant’s country of origin every 
tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some remote labor 
camp . . . . In such a case it would be only too apparent that anyone who has 
managed to escape from the country in question will have “well-founded fear 
of being persecuted” upon his eventual return.53 
Lower courts have held that the well-founded fear standard includes both a 
subjective and objective component.54  Thus, in contrast to the standard for 
withholding of deportation, the applicant’s state of mind and presence of a 
genuine fear is a real, relevant factor in the analysis.  However, an applicant 
still must demonstrate the exact bases upon which he or she fears persecution, 
be it political views, social group, or any of the other categories, and must 
 
 48. Thus, in Moshud v. Blackman, the Third Circuit affirmed the BIA’s denial of a 
withholding of deportation under the Convention Against Torture.  68 F. App’x 328, 335 (3d Cir. 
2003) (unpublished decision).  The court stated that although FGM was widespread in the alien’s 
home country, the practice had been made illegal, and public officials had condemned the 
practice.  Id.  However, the court overturned the BIA’s decision to deny withholding of removal 
under the non-Convention statutory provision.  Id.  It held that the BIA’s determination of the 
alien’s failure to prove reasonable fear was “unsupported by evidence.”  Id. 
 49. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 469. 
 52. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987). 
 53. Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 177 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. at 431). 
 54. Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990); Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 
79 (4th Cir. 1989). 
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establish every fact by a preponderance of the evidence.55  Asylum is also 
granted at the discretion of the Attorney General.56  Courts are reluctant to 
overturn such a decision and will not do so unless a reasonable fact finder 
would be obliged to reach the opposite result.57 
D. Past Persecution and Humanitarian Asylum 
When an alien establishes past persecution based on one of the enumerated 
grounds, “it shall be presumed that the applicant’s life or freedom would be 
threatened in the future in the country of removal.”58  However, this 
presumption is rebutted upon a finding that there has been a fundamental 
change in the applicant’s home country such that the applicant’s life would not 
be threatened were he or she to return presently.59  Changes in country 
conditions, however, must be shown to negate the particular refugee’s fears so 
as to make them unreasonable.60  The presumption can also be rebutted by a 
showing that the applicant could relocate to another part of his or her country, 
and thus avoid persecution.61  However, courts have recognized that in 
countries undergoing serious civil strife or ongoing dangerous conditions, this 
may not be a plausible option.62 
If the government does successfully rebut the alien’s assumption of past 
persecution, there is another alternative available to him or her.  The Attorney 
General has discretion to grant asylum for humanitarian reasons.63  
Humanitarian asylum is granted where “the alien has suffered an ‘atrocious 
form[ ] of persecution.’”64  Humanitarian asylum requires only proof of severe 
 
 55. Daniel J. Smith, Political Asylum—Well-Founded Fear of Persecution, 13 AM. JUR. 3D 
Proof of Facts 665 § 2 (2005). 
 56. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428. 
 57. This deferential standard of review stems partly from the watershed Chevron case.  
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  Even the 
significantly deferential approach taken under the Chevron doctrine does not capture the full 
extent to which courts defer to the BIA, however.  Under a so-called “plenary power” doctrine in 
immigration law, courts exhibit deference even greater than that required under the Chevron 
doctrine.  See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547–50, 559–60 (1990). 
 58. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1) (2004). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Awale v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 527, 531 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 61. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(B).  This option of “relocation” is only required where 
“reasonable.”  Id.  Courts are to look at a non-exclusive list of factors, including whether the 
applicant would face harm in the place where he or she relocated, and social and cultural 
restraints, such as gender.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13. 
 62. Awale, 384 F.3d at 531 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3)). 
 63. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13. 
 64. Asani v. INS, 154 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 
19 (BIA 1989)). 
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past persecution, but not proof of a well-founded fear of future persecution.65  
In Brucaj v. Ashcroft, the Seventh Circuit remanded an alien’s case for better 
explanation of why her claim for humanitarian asylum had been denied.66  In 
the court’s opinion, the severe abuse that the applicant had experienced—a 
brutal gang-rape, beating, and abandonment—was sufficient to show she 
would probably suffer severe psychological distress upon return to her 
country.67  The court opined that if the BIA wished to withhold humanitarian 
asylum, it would have to distinguish Brucaj’s claims from other presumably 
similar cases in which it had granted asylum.68  In applying for humanitarian 
asylum, the alien does not need to show “objective” or expert evidence that she 
would experience psychological harm upon return to the home country; as with 
a grant of asylum, her credible testimony may suffice.69 
E. Persecution 
Under both asylum and withholding of deportation, the applicant must 
show—to a greater or lesser degree—that she may be persecuted.  There is no 
universally accepted definition of  “persecution,” and “attempts to formulate 
such a definition have met with little success.”70  The Ninth Circuit has offered 
the very broad proposition that persecution is “the infliction of suffering or 
harm upon those who differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive.”71  The same 
court has stated that rape or sexual assault may constitute persecution.72  
Additionally, in May 1995, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
itself officially recognized sexual abuse and rape as possible forms of 
persecution.73 
Persecution, however, should not be equated with harassment or mere ill-
treatment.  For example, the First Circuit has articulated that a brief detention 
 
 65. See Brucaj v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2004).  Thus, even if the 
presumption of future persecution has been rebutted, “an alien may have suffered such severe or 
atrocious forms of persecution at the hands of the former regime such that it would be inhumane 
to require the alien to return to his home country.”  Id. 
 66. Id. at 611. 
 67. Id. at 610. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Smith, supra note 55, at § 4; see also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 
1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ¶ 51 
(1992), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/refugeehandbook.pdf. 
 71. Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 726–27 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 
102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969)). 
 72. Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 73. Id. at 963. 
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on several occasions did not rise to the level of persecution.74  Rather, 
persecution “encompasses more than threats to life or freedom, but less than 
mere harassment or annoyance.”75  Other courts have defined persecution even 
more strictly, as not “encompass[ing] all treatment that our society regards as 
unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”76  The Third Circuit 
seemingly limits persecution to “threats to life, confinement, torture, and 
economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a real threat to life or 
freedom.”77 
Courts have also stated that persecution must be inflicted either by the 
government or by groups that the national government was unwilling or unable 
to control.78  Thus, where the source of the treatment is personal hostility, it is 
usually considered outside the realm of “persecution,” and asylum is denied.79  
Moreover, a showing that one would suffer persecution as a result of generally 
harsh conditions in one’s home country usually does not secure a grant of 
asylum.80  These limitations on the definition of persecution may be 
particularly disadvantageous to women.  Women’s conditions in many 
developing and undeveloped countries, for example, are “generally harsh,” and 
their basic rights are likely to be violated.  Such a broad group (women from a 
particular region or country) would most likely be excluded from the 
“persecution” definition.  Finally, “persecution” is limited to the infliction of 
harm for reasons that this country does not recognize as legitimate.81  Thus, 
punishments or prosecutions for crimes that the applicant had committed 
would most likely not be considered “persecution.”82   
It is important to keep in mind that once the alien establishes persecution, 
he or she must then show that the persecution was visited upon him or her on 
account of membership in a particular social group.83  This means that the 
petitioner “must present some evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the 
persecutor’s motive.”84  Thus, because marital rape and spousal abuse, very 
significant problems facing women, arise out of personal relationships, they 
could be classified as “arising out of personal hostilities,” and not on account 
 
 74. Fesseha v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2003).  In that case, the woman was only 
“detained, not imprisoned,” was held for only twenty-four hours, and was never harmed.  Id. 
 75. Id. at 18 (quoting Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 570 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 76. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 77. Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 
1066 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
 78. E.g., McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 79. Zayas-Marini v. INS, 785 F.2d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 80. Smith, supra note 55, at § 4. 
 81. Procedures for Asylum and Witholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2004). 
 82. Id.  This is true as long as the lawful punishments or sanctions inflicted on a person do 
not “defeat the object and purpose of the Convention Against Torture to prohibit torture.”  Id. 
 83. Id. at § 208.16. 
 84. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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of the woman’s membership in a particular social group.  Yet if a specific 
social group consisting of “women in certain situations” or “of certain status or 
beliefs” can be established, it may be fairly easy to prove that membership in 
the group is the reason for which they are persecuted.  Alternatively, if the 
government fails to take appropriate action against individuals who thus 
deprive women of their human rights, one can argue that it is complicit in the 
persecution. 
F. Standard of Review 
The standard of judicial review of BIA determinations is narrow.  The 
basic theory is that the attorney general should have broad discretion to 
determine which aliens are allowed to remain in the country and which must 
leave.  “[Immigration law] authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, 
to grant asylum to an alien . . . .”85  Notably, this role is not constitutionally 
granted to the attorney general, nor even generally to the executive branch.  On 
the other hand, it is also worth noting that there continue to be cases which, 
even under the deferential “plenary power doctrine,” effectively reverse the 
BIA’s decisions, thus limiting its discretionary power.86 
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA)87 allows for a system of “expedited removal” for arriving aliens who 
do not possess appropriate identification.  As some practitioners have noted, 
“[a]lthough IIRIRA was promoted as an illegal immigration bill, it’s [sic] far 
reaching provisions have had a serious impact on legal immigration as well.”88  
The IIRIRA establishes a screening program that allows INS officers to 
conduct an evaluation of an alien’s admissibility, if that alien is just arriving in 
the United States or if he or she has not been continually present in the country 
for more than two years.89  If the officer determines the alien is inadmissible, 
the officer can remove the alien from the United States with no further review, 
unless the alien indicates at that time that he or she wishes to apply for asylum 
status.90 
 
 85. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (citing section 208(a) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988)). 
 86. See, e.g., Brucaj v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 602, 611 (reversing and remanding to the BIA 
when it disregarded the valid humanitarian asylum option for an alien). 
 87. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
 88. Henry J. Chang, The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, http://www.americanlaw.com/1996law.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2005). 
 89. The Expedited Removal Study: Report on the First Three Years of Implementation of 
Expedited Removal, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2001) [hereinafter 
Expedited Removal Study]. 
 90. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 304; see also Expedited 
Removal Study, supra note 89, at 5–6 (citing INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(i)). 
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Even if the alien does indicate to the INS officer that she wishes to apply 
for asylum status, she will only be assigned an “asylum officer.”91  That officer 
then conducts another screening, this time to determine if the alien has a 
credible fear of persecution.92  But if  the officer finds there is no credible fear, 
then the alien is deported without further proceedings.93  If the alien requests a 
prompt review by an immigration judge, the judge may review the case, as 
long as the review is accomplished within seven days of the officer’s 
determination.94  The INS officer thus practically retains almost complete 
discretion; the alien being deported would have to have her wits firmly about 
her and her knowledge of the law clear: she must first request a grant of 
asylum, and then a prompt review by an immigration judge.  The chances of 
this seem slim at best.95 
Studies have shown that “the expedited removal system that Congress 
implemented in 1996 has had a disparate impact on women asylum seekers.”96  
Statistically, more women are removed subject to this process than are their 
male counterparts.97  This may be because women, due to cultural norms, are 
less likely to possess documentation such as identification, or to be articulate 
enough to comply with legal standards of proof.98  This is especially likely to 
be true given the narrow window of time that Congress has provided before 
expedited removal is carried out.99 
IV.  FGM DECISIONS AND OTHER CLAIMS TO “SOCIAL GROUP” 
A. The Elusive Nature of “Social Group” 
Because women are not entitled to a separate ground for asylum because of 
persecution based on their sex, women have had to attempt to fit their claims 
into the most flexible of the available statutory grounds—social group.100  A 
 
 91. Expedited Removal Study, supra note 89, at 5–6. 
 92. Id. at 6. 
 93. Id. at 8. 
 94. Id. at 7. 
 95. Section 306 of the IIRIRA lists the types of judicial review options now eliminated by its 
enactment.  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 306.  For example, 
with few exceptions, no court now has jurisdiction over orders of removal.  See id.  Courts are 
mostly stripped of jurisdiction to review any action that is discretionary with the attorney general.  
See id.  Likewise, when an order of removal has been given, habeas corpus actions are only 
sustainable to determine whether the petitioner is an alien and ordered removed and whether the 
alien can prove that he or she is a lawfully admitted alien.  Id. 
 96. Nessel, supra note 43, at 96. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 95. 
 99. See id. at 96. 
 100. Nessel has called this requirement of showing membership in a smaller group of women 
the “gender-plus” protected group.  Id. at 76. 
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comprehensive definition of “social group” proves challenging at best.  “There 
is a tendency on the part of applicants to view ‘social group’ in an expansive 
manner, while the INS tends to view it in a restrictive manner.”101  As the 
Ninth Circuit has noted, “The case law regarding the definition of ‘particular 
social group’ is not wholly consistent.”102  As a general statement, however, 
the Ninth Circuit has stated that the concept “is a flexible one which extends 
broadly to encompass many groups who do not otherwise fall within the other 
categories of race, nationality, religion, or political opinion.”103 Working 
within the confines of existing law, the social group category offers a practical 
way for women to obtain asylum. 
The First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have adopted the BIA’s approach, 
which defines social group as being composed of individuals who share a 
common, immutable characteristic.104 The Third Circuit has laid out three 
specific requirements to qualify for membership in a particular social group: 
the alien must identify a particular social group; the alien must establish that he 
or she is a member of the group; and the alien must show that he or she was 
persecuted because of membership in the group.105  In a decision by the Third 
Circuit, the court held that Ugandian children who were formerly enslaved as 
child soldiers by guerilla groups, and who escaped their enslavement, 
constituted a particular social group for the purpose of granting asylum.106  The 
court emphasized that this categorization was based on the children’s shared 
experiences: being kidnapped, being persecuted at the hands of guerrilla 
groups, and subsequently escaping from the group.107  The alien was unable to 
change his past role as a child soldier, and therefore this was considered the 
“immutable characteristic” upon which a social group was formed.108  Further, 
because escaped child soldiers were likely to be killed upon their return, they 
also could adequately demonstrate a fear of future persecution based on their 
social group.109 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit originally held that to belong to a particular 
social group, a “voluntary associational relationship” was necessary.110  
Recently, however, that circuit has expanded its definition to harmonize it with 
the BIA’s immutability requirement; it currently defines “social group” as a 
 
 101. Smith, supra note 55, at § 9.  The U.N. Handbook defines a social group in a broad 
manner as well, as made up of persons of similar background, habits, or social status.  Id. 
 102. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 103. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 104. See Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 105. Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 106. Id. at 183. 
 107. Id. at 178. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 179. 
 110. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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group either “united by a voluntary association . . . or by an innate 
characteristic that is . . . fundamental to the identities or consciences of its 
members.”111  The Second Circuit, meanwhile, has adopted the Ninth Circuit’s 
previous “voluntary association” test, while adding a requirement that the 
members of a social group must be externally distinguishable.112 
The Sixth Circuit has adopted the approach taken by the First, Third, and 
Seventh Circuits.  In Castellano-Chacon,113 the applicant, a tattooed twenty-
seven-year-old, argued he should be considered part of a “particular social 
group” that was being persecuted by the government.114  Using the “immutable 
characteristic” test, the Sixth Circuit held that “tattooed youth” could not be 
considered a social group for purposes of meeting INA requirements, as the 
youths had no common background or innate characteristic to distinguish 
them, beyond the tattoos which they had chosen to acquire.115  While 
recognizing that “the definition of a ‘social group’ is a flexible one,” the court 
held that “the term cannot be without some outer limit, outside of which 
tattooed youth surely falls.”116 
The “immutability requirement” adopted by many of the circuits is a 
positive move in the direction of granting asylum to victimized women.  By 
basing the term on a fundamental characteristic that cannot be changed, the 
door is theoretically opened to claims of asylum for women who share a 
sufficiently similar background, for example, being from a region in which 
women are persecuted.  Thus, in Awale v. Ashcroft, the Eighth Circuit granted 
a Somali woman, whose clan was under attack, asylum because of persecution 
based on social group.117  The court held that clans could constitute a social 
group as clans are the “key social group for virtually all Somalis.”118  The 
regional or specialized characteristics usually necessary to achieve social group 
classifications are clearly demonstrated by the FGM cases. 
B. Using “Social Group” in the FGM Context 
In re Kasinga was the first case to hold that forced FGM involved an 
infliction of grave harm constituting persecution on account of membership in 
a social group.119  There, the BIA recognized a social group comprised of 
young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe in Northern Togo who had not 
 
 111. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 112. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 113. Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 114. Id. at 538–39, 545–46.  The persecution consisted of extra-judicial killings of those with 
tattoos, commonly thought to belong to gangs.  Id. 
 115. Id. at 549. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Awale v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 527, 532 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 118. Id. at 529. 
 119. In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 (1996). 
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undergone FGM and who opposed the practice.120  Other cases have similarly 
recognized the category of women who have not undergone FGM, and who are 
opposed to it, as comprising a social group for purposes of refugee status.121 
Even where FGM is involved, the door is not completely open.  For 
instance, the Fifth Circuit has taken a hard-line approach regarding women 
who have already undergone FGM and are trying to establish a claim for 
persecution based on social group.122  In a non-precedential decision, the court 
declared that because the applicant had already undergone FGM, a 
“fundamental change” in her circumstances—required to rebut the 
presumption that past persecution would occur again in the future—was 
present.123  The result points to a more limited view of social groups: women 
who are likely to be persecuted and have undergone one drastic example of 
persecution are nonetheless deemed not to have sufficiently established a clear 
probability that they will be persecuted again on the basis of their gender.  
Because FGM is only performed once, there was no danger that the applicant 
would have been subjected to the same persecution again.  The court thus 
declined to expand the social group to these women who were likely to 
experience other, different forms of persecution—in this case marital rape, 
wife-beating, and abduction by marriage.124 
C. The Success of Non-FGM Claims: “Social Group” or “Political Beliefs”? 
FGM, which has received much attention in the media and on human rights 
groups’ agendas, seems to fare fairly well as the basis for a “social group.”  
Other claims involving women at risk for gross human rights violations in the 
area of reproductive rights have also been successful.  For example, in Zhu v. 
Ashcroft, a young Chinese woman sought a withholding of deportation by 
establishing a claim of “social group” based on reproductive restrictions 
applied to women in China.125  Zhu, an unmarried woman, already had one 
abortion in China, upon threat of being jailed if she refused.126  While in the 
United States, she gave birth to another child.127  The Immigration Judge (IJ) 
 
 120. Id. at 356–59.  Clearly, this is a slim, very well-defined group. 
 121. See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating “forced female genital 
mutilation . . . can form the basis of a successful claim for asylum”); Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 
18, 26 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that applicant had a reasonable fear of being subjected to FGM, as 
she was a non-virgin in her tribe and FGM was punishment for pre-marital sex, and that this 
constituted persecution). 
 122. Seifu v. Ashcroft, 80 F. App’x 323, 323–24 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 123. Id.  It is unclear if the court considered granting humanitarian asylum in this case. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 382 F.3d 521, 522–23 (5th Cir. 2004).  In China, an unmarried woman may not obtain 
permission to have a child.  Id. at 524. 
 126. Id. at 523. 
 127. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] OPENING THE DOORS TO WOMEN? 679 
remarked that forced abortion and sterilization are on the decline in China, and 
Zhu could therefore not show by a clear probability that she would be 
persecuted.128  The Fifth Circuit criticized the IJ’s statements as both 
“moralistic” and “sexist.”129  The case was ultimately remanded to determine 
whether the meaning of the word “forced” applied to Zhu’s first abortion, 
putting her in the category of persecuted persons, and whether the situation in 
China was such as to make it likely Zhu would experience persecution in the 
future.130 
The case represents a greater sensitivity to the problem of reproductive 
restrictions in China and other nations.  Although the abortion may not have 
been literally or physically “forced,” it was certainly coerced (by the looming 
threat of jail—according to Zhu, a typical punishment for women who give 
birth out of wedlock).131  If “forced” is given a broader definition, then the 
claims of many women seeking asylum on this ground will be strengthened.  
Most of the forced abortion cases, however, have been based not on the “social 
group” designation, but have been classified as persecution on the basis of 
political opinion.  Applicants who are granted asylum or withholding of 
deportation often succeed on the ground that their political ideology is opposed 
to China’s restricted parenthood policy.132  The social group designation could 
potentially work for these women, but they have had no need to utilize it, as 
their claims have been addressed statutorily.  On the other hand, women who 
are denied other reproductive freedoms in their own country, such as women 
from regions where contraception is outlawed or largely unavailable, could 
potentially use the social group designation to their advantage. 
Under the current trend, which for the most part utilizes the “immutable 
characteristic” definition of “social group,” the prospects for expanding the 
definition of “social group” to include more groups of persecuted women 
seems good at first glance.  As all women share the characteristic of sex, and 
though this quality is unfortunately (unlike race or religion) not a foundation 
 
 128. Id. at 525.  If the conditions in China had so changed, this would override the rebuttable 
presumption to which a refugee candidate is normally entitled.  Namely, when such a person has 
been persecuted in the past, she has a well-founded fear of future persecution and should be 
granted asylum.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000); see also Brucaj v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 602, 606 
(7th Cir. 2004).  However, even if the government does rebut the presumption of future 
persecution, the attorney general may still grant asylum as a matter of discretion if the alien has 
suffered an atrocious form of persecution.  Procedures for Asylum and Witholding of Removal, 8 
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A) (2004). 
 129. Zhu, 382 F.3d at 526 n.2.  Among other things, the IJ had suggested that Zhu could “join 
a group of people living in China’s ‘floating population’ to avoid persecution.”  Id. at 525. 
 130. Id. at 527–28. 
 131. Id. at 523. 
 132. The reason for this designation is that asylum law states: “[A] person who has been 
forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization . . . shall be deemed to have 
been persecuted on account of political opinion.”  Id. at 527 n.5 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
680 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:661 
for refugee status in itself, when coupled with a shared background or set of 
experiences this should place many women squarely within the definition of 
“social group.” 
Decisions like Seifu and Zubeda appear to limit the expansiveness of the 
term, however.133  The Shoafera and Angoucheva decisions, both cited by the 
Zubeda court, do address rape and sexual violence, two of the main concerns 
of disadvantaged women worldwide.134  However, they do not portend much 
hope for an expansion of the social group category.  In Angoucheva, a 
Bulgarian woman asserting her Macedonian heritage was beaten and, on 
another occasion, sexually assaulted by members of the armed forces.135  She 
was granted asylum, but not on the basis of the social group designation.  
Rather, the fact that Macedonians were viewed as political dissidents—and 
further that the alien was a member of a politically active Macedonian group—
gave Angoucheva a claim based on political beliefs.136  Therefore, this decision 
does not represent an expansion of the social group category.  Nor does it 
address the case of women who are sexually assaulted by non-state actors.  
Indeed, like Zubeda, the case appears to rest on official government 
involvement.137  The fact that Angoucheva was sexually assaulted appears to 
be merely a “side issue” in the court’s real concern with political freedom—
again public rights are emphasized while private rights are minimized.  
Similarly, in Shoafera, an Ethiopian citizen of Amharic ethnicity was raped by 
a government official.138  The Ninth Circuit rested its decision on the fact that 
the alien had been raped because of her ethnicity.139  Though positive, the fact 
that these cases involve both government officials and ethnic or political 
elements renders them off-point to private party rape cases and domestic 
violence concerns. 
D. “Private-Party” Rape Cases and Domestic Violence 
In cases of “private party” rape and domestic violence, it therefore remains 
unclear if women can successfully bring asylum or withholding of deportation 
claims under a social group designation.  Yet in such cases, it is no less vital 
 
 133. Again, however, Seifu is not a precedential decision and, accordingly, has limited value.  
See Seifu v. Ashcroft, 80 F.App’x 323 (5th Cir. 2003).  Zubeda, while a precedential decision, 
recognizes the possibility of rape constituting sufficient persecution to support a claim for 
asylum, even though the court does not base its decision on this ground.  Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 
F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 134. Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2000); Angoucheva v. INS, 106 F.3d 781 (7th 
Cir. 1997). 
 135. 106 F.3d at 783. 
 136. Id. at 789–90. 
 137. See id. 
 138. 228 F.3d at 1072. 
 139. Id. at 1075–76. 
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that women be able to seek asylum and withholding of deportation under 
statutory provisions.  From a victim’s perspective, a rape is likely equally 
degrading, traumatizing, or criminal whether it is perpetrated by a soldier or a 
civilian.  At least one case, not to mention numerous psychological and 
sociological studies, has documented the long-lasting psychological and 
physical effects of rape.140  The court noted that “the suffering of rape 
survivors is strikingly similar . . . to the suffering endured by torture 
survivors,”141 drawing no distinction between private-party rape and 
government-perpetrated rape.  Further, the court cited common long-term 
symptoms of rape as “chronic anxiety . . . sexual dysfunctions, physical 
distress, mistrust of others, phobias, depression, hostility, and suicidal 
thoughts.”142 
As noted above, women in certain parts of the African continent are at high 
risk for becoming infected with HIV through marital rape or abusive partners 
who refuse to use protection during sex.143  Social spurning, illness, and 
eventual death can be added to the list of “symptoms” these women will 
experience as a result of rape.  Because of the severe harm occasioned by rape, 
women who seek asylum should not be denied based on the identity of their 
rapist.  Rather, if a woman can prove that she is likely to be raped upon return 
to her home country, it should be irrelevant, for purposes of granting the 
woman asylum, whether the perpetrator would act with government consent or 
acquiescence. 
It is also currently unclear whether women who are persecuted in the 
domestic context could be entitled to protection under the social group 
designation; in the event that the government takes no action in response to 
women’s claims of domestic violence—by shrugging the violence off as “a 
private matter” for instance—such women could potentially use the social 
group designation to their advantage.  One case that has raised the social group 
categorization in regard to abused women is Rusovan v. INS.144  There, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the woman in question could not use the desired 
social group as a means to remain in the United States.145  Critically, the court 
held that the beatings by Rusovan’s husband were a private matter, and since 
Rusovan had not sought protection from the government, she could not 
establish that such abuse was “uncontrolled” by the government.146 
 
 140. Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954, 962–63 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 141. Id. at 963 (quoting Evelyn Mary Aswad, Torture by Means of Rape, 84 GEORGETOWN 
L.J. 1913, 1931 (1996)). 
 142. Id. (citing Am. Med. Ass’n Council on Scientific Affairs, Violence Against Women: 
Relevance for Medical Practitioners, J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3184 (1992)). 
 143. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 144. No. 97–2819, 1998 WL 789999, at *1 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 1998). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at *2. 
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This decision does allow at least a potential social group classification for 
women in domestic violence situations, as long as they first seek help from the 
government.  However, the decision fails to take into account that many 
women, aware of their government’s lack of attention to domestic violence, 
may rightly despair of any help coming from their government and may thus 
fail to pursue local remedies.  Again, the reliance on the traditional 
public/private motivation for the persecution demonstrates the Western and 
male-dominated view of human rights. 
Legislation has recently been enacted in the United States in order to 
combat the recognized problem of domestic violence within this country.  In 
2000, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act of 2000 
(VAWA).147  Under Title V of VAWA (“Battered Immigrant Women 
Protection Act of 2000”), spouses of American citizens who are victims of 
domestic violence may seek withholding of removal, naturalization, or 
asylum.148  VAWA is certainly to be applauded for its effort to protect women 
suffering under domestic violence.  Aliens who are seeking refuge from an 
abusive spouse abroad have not found protection under VAWA, however—at 
least in the Ninth Circuit.  In Alfaro-Rodriguez v. INS, the applicant for asylum 
had been abused, threatened, and harassed by guerillas in El Salvador—one of 
whom was her common-law husband.149  The court denied the alien’s claim for 
suspension of deportation under VAWA.150  It stated that “the relevant 
statutory provisions apply narrowly to women who have lived in the United 
States with, and who are abused by, spouses who are American citizens or 
permanent residents.”151  Since Alfaro-Rodriguez had come to the United 
States alone to escape domestic violence, she did not fit the statutory mold.152  
Thus, VAWA is insufficient to protect a woman in the refugee context when 
her spouse is of non-American nationality, rendering it a closed avenue—at 
least at present—for women seeking asylum. 
E. How Far Can the Social Group Category Expand? 
Although such an expansion of “social group” might seem as though it 
would grant a blanket blessing for any woman seeking entry to the United 
States, I think this country is unlikely to experience a mass influx of women 
refugees.  It is important to keep in mind that a woman must still offer 
 
 147. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 
Stat 1464.  The Act is split into three divisions: (A) Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 
(B) Violence Against Women Act of 2000, (C) Miscellaneous Provisions.  Id. 
 148. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 1504. 
 149. 203 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision), No. 98-70289, 1999 WL 
1091990, at *1. 
 150. Id. at *2. 
 151. Id. at *3 n.4. 
 152. Id. at *2, *3 n.4. 
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evidence that she is likely to be the subject of rape or abuse, either statistically 
by her status as a woman in a particular area, or as a result of her past 
experiences or reasonable current belief that she will be subjected to such 
torture.  Therefore, broadening the definition of social group should not be 
conceived of as tantamount to saying any woman who wants to gain entry to—
or remain in—the United States may do so.  At its potential broadest, a better 
conception of “social group” could be formulated as: “women who offer good 
evidence that they are likely to be persecuted because of their gender.”   
Indeed, there is probably much more reason to think that the categories 
will remain somewhat under-inclusive—that the category of social group as 
pertaining to women in dangerous situations will remain too narrow to afford 
protection to all endangered women.  Safaie v. INS seems to indicate such a 
result.153  Safaie, an Iranian alien, asserted that Iranian women, “by virtue of 
their innate characteristic (their sex) and the harsh restrictions placed upon 
them, are a particular social group.”154  However, the Eighth Circuit held that 
all Iranian women could not constitute a social group for the purposes of 
granting asylum.155  Even though the restrictions placed on the women were 
clearly because of their sex, the court held that not all of the women could 
establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a personal level.156 
It is important to note at this point that, although this Comment deals with 
human rights abuses against women, many men also suffer from persecution 
based on sexual identity or affinity.  Use of the social group category should, 
of course, not be limited to just women who can show a likelihood of gender or 
sexual identity-related abuse in their country of origin.  Such a limitation 
would be inherently sexist.  Rather, any man who can similarly show such 
persecution should also be granted asylum or withholding of deportation.  For 
example, men seeking asylum because of persecution for their sexual 
orientation should be granted the same degree of protection as persecuted 
women.157  Along these lines, gay men with female sexual identities—a group 
 
 153. 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 154. Id. at 640. 
 155. Id. (stating that this group was too “overbroad” to constitute a social group). 
 156. Id.  However, the narrower group of Iranian women who refuse to conform to Iranian 
laws, and who would experience persecution because of their opposition, may be protected by the 
“social group” designation, at least according to the Third Circuit.  Id. at 640.  Safaie, however, 
was held not to fit the criteria, as she had conformed her dress to some degree, and had only been 
imprisoned for brief periods of time, not constituting “persecution.”  Id. at 640–41. 
 157. Indeed, then-Attorney General Janet Reno confirmed in 1994 that homosexuals could 
seek asylum as a persecuted class, included under the definition of social group.  See Bonnie 
Miluso, Note, Family “De-Unification” in the United States: International Law Encourages 
Immigration Reform for Same-Gender Binational Partners, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 915, 
923 (2004). 
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which is often persecuted in Mexico—have been held to constitute a social 
group for the purpose of granting asylum.158 
V.  CLAIMS FOR DERIVATIVE ASYLUM: ISSUES IN LINE-DRAWING 
The question of derivative asylum in women’s human rights claims—
women, who so often must take on the burden of caring for children and the 
elderly and probably have a higher number of dependents—doubtless raises 
the specter of unassociated persons “latching on” to women’s valid asylum 
claims.  Thus, in advocating derivative asylum, the question of line-drawing 
arises in regard to the “deriving” individual’s claim.  For example, if spouses 
and children are allowed derivative asylum, should brothers and sisters also 
be?  What about first cousins, or aunts and uncles?  One solution would be to 
allow derivative claims for children, spouses, and parents or guardians, but 
deny it for more attenuated relationships, in light of the uniquely close 
relationship of spouses, and the unique need of a child for his or her guardian. 
FGM cases illustrate issues in close-relationship derivative asylum cases.  
These cases have commonly raised problems for parents who fear their 
children will be subjected to the practice, but who have no independent basis 
for asylum themselves.  When such parents are deported to their country of 
origin, they are left with the moral dilemma of taking their children with them 
(and likely exposing them to FGM), or leaving them in the care of, in many 
instances, strangers in the United States.  Again, the federal circuits differ on 
whether claims for derivative asylum should be granted in FGM cases.  The 
Seventh Circuit, for example, appears to have taken a rather restrictive view of 
when derivative asylum will be granted for parents.159  In Oforji v. Ashcroft, 
the Seventh Circuit held that an alien could not establish a derivative claim for 
asylum by showing potential hardship to her children, who were, at that time, 
citizens of the United States.160  Oforji sought to establish her derivative claim 
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture, on the basis of her 
daughter’s likelihood of being forced to undergo FGM.161  The court relied on 
the doctrine of “constructive deportation” and refused to expand the category 
of cases that fell within the guidelines of the doctrine.162  Under the doctrine of 
constructive deportation, only if the child would be deported along with the 
 
 158. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 159. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 160. Id. at 618. 
 161. Id. at 614–15. 
 162. Id. at 615–16.  The court stated, “It is important to understand that claims of constructive 
deportation are cognizable only if such a claim falls squarely within the narrow holdings of the 
cases creating the doctrine.”  Id. at 615.  The claim of derivative asylum/constructive deportation 
was based on the United Nations Convention Against Torture, as implemented in 8 C.F.R. §§ 
208.16(c) and 208.18(b)(2).  Oforji, 354 F.3d at 614–15. 
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parent should asylum be granted to the parent.163  The court in three ways 
distinguished Oforji’s case from an earlier case in which it had granted 
derivative asylum.  First, Oforji’s two female children were legal residents of 
the United States and were not at risk for being deported.164  Second, Oforji did 
not enter the United States legally.165  Third, she did not remain in the United 
States for the required period of seven years to meet an “exceptional hardship 
claim” for her child.166  The court thus held that an alien parent with no other 
basis for asylum cannot establish a derivative claim by “pointing to potential 
hardship to the alien’s United States citizen child in the event of the alien’s 
deportation.”167 
The concurring opinion in Oforji recognized that using a rigid, time-based 
rule (the seven-year rule) did not adequately measure the amount of hardship 
that would be imposed on a child, were his or her parent to be deported.168  
Rather, “[w]hat is true is that the longer the children have lived in the United 
States, the greater the hardship of them being sent back to their parent’s native 
country . . . .”169  Thus, the concurrence argued that determining the amount of 
hardship imposed on a child should take into account realistic factors, such as 
the age of the child and whether the child had previously lived in the native 
country.170 
In Olowo v. Ashcroft, the Seventh Circuit applied the principles it had 
established in Oforji.171  Because, in this case, both Olowo’s daughters and 
their father were legal residents of the United States, the court found no reason 
to withhold Olowo’s deportation.172  Moreover, the court was highly critical 
that Olowo would contemplate taking her daughters back to Nigeria, where 
they were likely to be subjected to FGM, rather than arrange for them to live in 
the United States.173  As in Oforji, the court ignored the practical aspects of 
being forced to make such a difficult choice, in favor of a rigidly applied 
citizen vs. non-citizen rule.  It failed to take into account the psychological and 
emotional impact on both the woman and children involved. 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit recently held in Abebe v. Ashcroft, that parents 
living in Ethiopia—a country where FGM is allegedly decided upon by family 
 
 163. See id. at 614–15. 
 164. Id. at 617. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 618. 
 168. Oforji, 354 F.3d at 619–21 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 169. Id. at 620. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 172. Id. at 701. 
 173. Id. at 701–02. 
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units—failed to establish a claim for derivative asylum.174  The problem was 
with the “well-founded fear” standard as applied to the facts of the case.  The 
court took the statements of Mengistu and Abebe (the parents in the case) that 
they were opposed to FGM, and that they would try to prevent FGM being 
performed on their daughter, to mean that there was a high probability she 
would never undergo the procedure.175  The dissent in Abebe argued that there 
was no evidence that the parents would actually be able to prevent FGM, 
regardless of their personal opposition to the practice.176  Importantly, the 
dissent recognized the quandary in which such parents find themselves.177  
Parents must either testify that they are powerless to stop the persecution, thus 
“risking court-ordered removal of their children in the event their asylum 
claims are rejected,” or lose the very basis of their asylum claim.178  The 
dissent specifically criticized the Olowo decision from the Seventh Circuit, 
which, “blind to the Hobson’s choice its own decision imposed, lambasted 
Olowo for seeking to take her daughters with her.”179  Finally, the dissent 
noted that “the Supreme Court has long protected, under due process 
principles, the integrity of the family and the right of the parents to raise their 
children,” in support of maintaining family unity by keeping parents and 
children together in the same country.180 
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit, in Abay v. Ashcroft, took a far more 
liberal view of derivative asylum.181  There, the court first determined that 
Amare, Abay’s nine-year-old daughter, would very likely be subjected to 
FGM, and that the evidence compelled a finding that she should be granted 
asylum.182  The Court then turned to the issue of whether Abay’s asylum claim, 
based on her fear that her daughter would be subjected to FGM, should be 
granted.183  Abay relied heavily on In re C-Y-Z184 for her position.185  In the 
case In re C-Y-Z, an alien seeking asylum argued that the forced sterilization of 
his wife should grant him derivative asylum as well.186  The BIA accepted the 
“past persecution” argument and also granted the alien husband refugee 
status.187  The Sixth Circuit cited In re C-Y-Z favorably, stating, “[I]t is not 
 
 174. 379 F.3d 755, 757, 760 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 175. Id. at 759. 
 176. Id. at 761 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Abebe, 379 F.3d at 762. 
 180. Id. at 763. 
 181. 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 182. Id. at 640. 
 183. Id. at 640–41. 
 184. 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (1997). 
 185. Abay, 368 F.3d at 641. 
 186. 21 I. & N. Dec. at 916. 
 187. Id. at 918. 
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unusual . . . that the applicant should be granted asylum although the harm 
experienced was not by him, but by a family member.”188  The court further 
reasoned that no one would expect a mother to be forced to leave her child in 
the United States in order to avoid persecution.189 
The Sixth Circuit thus found sufficient authority to support a parent’s 
derivative asylum based on a well-founded fear that his or her child would 
undergo FGM if the parent was deported.  The fact that FGM was outlawed in 
Ethiopia was unpersuasive to this court, as these laws were not enforced as a 
practical matter.190  Similarly unpersuasive was the fact that Abay was opposed 
to FGM, since the evidence tended to show that it is the in-laws who usually 
insist upon FGM before marriage.191  Abay was a significant step forward for 
both FGM cases and derivative rights for parents.  Unlike the decisions of the 
Ninth and Seventh Circuits, this quite recent case recognizes the practical 
concerns associated with granting asylum to underage children while 
withholding it from parents.  In so doing, it promotes stability in family units 
and prevents emotional trauma in both parents and children. 
Sometimes courts have drawn lines quite firmly in the context of derivative 
asylum.  For example, in Chen v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit upheld the BIA’s 
decision to deny derivative asylum to Chen based on the past persecution that 
his fiancée had suffered in China—a forced abortion in her eighth month of 
pregnancy.192  Although the court recognized that Chen would have a valid 
claim to derivative asylum if the couple were married, the fact that they were 
only engaged barred his claim.193  While this example may seem strict to the 
point of injustice, it is worth noting that courts can and do draw lines in 
recognizing derivative asylum—this undermines the argument that admitting 
parents, guardians, or spouses through derivative asylum will result in a flood 
of unassociated persons wrongly using the asylum claim. 
 
 188. Abay, 368 F.3d at 641 (quoting In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 926 (Rosenberg, J., 
concurring)). 
 189. Id. at 642. 
 190. Id. at 639. 
 191. Id. at 639–40. 
 192. 381 F.3d 221, 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 193. Id. at 228.  The court kept the firm distinction of married vs. unmarried even in light of 
the fact that China’s restrictive social laws had prevented the couple from marrying—the 
minimum age for marriage is 23 for women, and 25 for men.  See Id. at 223, 228.  The Ninth 
Circuit reached a contrary result on a similar set of facts in Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 
2004).  In Ma, the court held that the asylum applicant could establish persecution based on the 
forced abortion of his unborn child, notwithstanding the fact that he and the child’s mother were 
unmarried because of the high age restrictions on marriage in China.  Id. at 560–61. 
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In some cases, derivative asylum status may also be provided for by 
statute.  In the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,194 
Congress explicitly addressed the case of current or past victims of a “severe 
form” of trafficking in persons.195  Where such an alien has not yet reached the 
age of majority—twenty-one—his or her parents, spouse, and children may 
also be granted derivative asylum.196  Where the alien is an adult, a spouse or 
children may accompany him or her.197  Thus, as regards victims of trafficking, 
derivative line-drawing has already been done for the courts; it has been 
accomplished in such a way that parents, children, and spouses, typically the 
closest connections one has, are automatically granted asylum along with the 
affected alien.  The same kind of statutory initiative could be pursued for other 
refugees as well. 
A more difficult question along the same lines as Chen would involve 
homosexual “life partners.”  Because they are not currently granted the same 
legal status as married heterosexual couples—at least in the United States—the 
claim that life partners share the same sort of unique relationship that justifies 
marital derivative status could be unworkable.  There are some indications, 
however, that homosexual partners may be granted derivative status at some 
point.  One such sign is the B-2 Visa status classification that was extended to 
all “cohabitating partners,” not explicitly limited to spouses.198  In 2001, then-
Secretary of State Colin Powell issued a cable to diplomatic posts outlining a 
process whereby non-immigrants could accompany their non-immigrant 
partners to the United States.199  Through such measures, the potential for 
 
 194. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464.  The applicable provision of this Act, section 107 
(e)(1), thus amends section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15) (2000)). 
 195. The term “severe form of trafficking in persons” is defined under the Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act section 103(8) as: 
  (A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or 
coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years 
of age; or 
  (B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for 
labor or services, through the use of force, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to 
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 103(8)(A) and (B). 
 196. Id. § 107(e)(1)(C)(I). 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Miluso, supra note 157, at 923–24 for a discussion of the B-2 Visa option. 
 199. Id.  B-2 visas are issued to non-immigrants who wish to “travel for pleasure.”  Id. at 923.  
There is also pending legislation which, if passed, would allow U.S. citizens in committed 
relationships to sponsor their partners for immigration purposes.  See Thomas Prol & Daniel 
Weiss, Lifting a Lamp: Will New Jersey Create a Safe Harbor for Gay and Lesbian Immigration 
Rights?, N.J. LAW, Apr. 2004, at 22, 25.  Prol and Weiss note that the Permanent Partners 
Immigration Act (PPIA), if passed, would also probably facilitate derivative asylum claims of life 
partners by generating acceptance for immigration partner claims in general.  See id. 
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asylum through their partners’ claims may well increase for women and men 
from countries where homosexual relationships are outlawed or where 
homosexuals are persecuted because of their sexuality. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While advances have been made in recognizing women’s human rights 
claims, refugee laws as currently written and applied still help retain the status 
quo of women’s second-class citizenship, to a certain degree.  This is 
evidenced most clearly in the failure of the legislature to recognize sex as a 
valid basis, on its own, for granting asylum.  Although diverse groups of 
women have been granted asylum under the “social group” designation, the 
groups that have succeeded in doing so have been confined to specific regions, 
or consist of women who are in some way “different” from the rest of their 
society.  Thus groups of uncovered women, who have been unable to 
demonstrate a “gender-plus” justification for their asylum claim, fall through 
the cracks of refugee law.  Moreover, while there is general societal 
acknowledgement that the United States must use asylum law to protect 
women against gender-based violence, including domestic abuse, there is still 
reluctance on the part of courts to overcome the historic public–private 
distinction to award these claims the same kind of weight as traditional civil 
and political rights.  Further, the implementation of the IIRIRA reduces 
women’s opportunity to advocate asylum claims in a meaningful way. 
The most straightforward way for the United States to demonstrate its 
commitment to women’s human rights in refugee law would be to establish sex 
and sexual identity as independent bases for asylum.  Failing that, the next best 
solution may be to enact legislation to statutorily bring gender-based claims 
under the protection of asylum law.  The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 
2000,200 which allows withholding of deportation for any alien who has been 
or is a victim of severe trafficking in persons, could be a model for future 
legislation.  This may be a slow process, dealing with one or two women’s 
rights issues at a time.  At the same time, the legislature could ensure more 
consistent results in derivative asylum claims by statutorily defining the family 
members eligible for derivative asylum.  In so doing, Congress must also keep 
in mind the importance of maintaining family unity and protecting the 
emotional welfare of those who have already experienced trauma.  Where there 
is no existing legislation for derivative asylum on a certain issue, the role 
necessarily shifts to the courts to become more sensitive to the particular facts 
of each applicant’s situation.  A model to follow may be the Abay approach, as 
opposed to the overly strict “seven-year rule” or like standards. 
 
 200. This Act is “Division A” of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act. 
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Finally, courts may choose to expand the social group definition beyond its 
current state, so that in effect it covers the majority of women who are 
persecuted.  Although to this point courts have seemed unwilling to do so, 
greater public attention to the seriousness of women’s human rights violations, 
and resulting cultural changes in American society, may render the judiciary 
more open to accepting this designation as a workable substitute for “gender or 
sex-based claims.”  The FGM decisions have forged a path in the direction of 
hope and freedom for women who would otherwise experience grave 
violations of some of their most valuable rights.  Advocates, judges, and 
Congress must continually work together to achieve the same recognition and 
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